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Web applications are typically developed with hard 
time constraints and are often deployed with security 
vulnerabilities. Automatic web vulnerability scanners 
can help to locate these vulnerabilities and are 
popular tools among developers of web applications. 
Their purpose is to stress the application from the 
attacker’s point of view by issuing a huge amount of 
interaction within it. Two of the most widely spread 
and dangerous vulnerabilities in web applications are 
SQL injection and Cross Site Scripting (XSS), because 
of the damage they may cause to the victim business. 
Trusting the results of web vulnerability scanning tools 
is of utmost importance. Without a clear idea on the 
coverage and false positive rate of these tools, it is 
difficult to judge the relevance of the results they 
provide. Furthermore, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to compare key figures of merit of web vulnerability 
scanners. In this paper we propose a method to 
evaluate and benchmark automatic web vulnerability 
scanners using software fault injection techniques. The 
most common types of software faults are injected in 
the web application code which is then checked by the 
scanners. The results are compared by analyzing 
coverage of vulnerability detection and false positives. 
Three leading commercial scanning tools are 
evaluated and the results show that in general the 
coverage is low and the percentage of false positives is 




Web applications are extremely popular today. 
Nearly all information systems and business 
applications (e-commerce, banking, transportation, 
web mail, blogs, etc) are now built as web-based 
database applications. They are so exposed to attacks 
that any existing security vulnerability will most 
probably be uncovered and exploited, which may have 
a highly negative impact on users. Automatic web 
vulnerability scanners are often used by web 
application developers and system administrators to 
test web applications against vulnerabilities. Therefore, 
trusting the results of web vulnerability scanners is 
essential. To what extent can one trust the verdict 
delivered by web vulnerability scanners, especially 
when the tool report suggests that there are no 
vulnerabilities in the web application? The answer to 
this question is the focal point of this paper. 
Traditional security mechanisms like network 
firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and use of 
encryption can protect the network but cannot mitigate 
attacks targeting web applications, even assuming that 
key infrastructure components such as web servers and 
database management systems (DBMS) are fully 
secure. Hence, hackers are moving their focus from 
network to web applications where poor programming 
code represents a major risk. This can be confirmed by 
numerous vulnerability reports available in specialized 
sites like www.securityfocus.com, 
www.ntbugtraq.com, www.kb.cert.org/vuls, etc. 
This year the Open Web Application Security 
Project released its ten most critical web application 
security vulnerabilities [1] based on data provided by 
Mitre [2]. This report ranked XSS as the most critical 
vulnerability, followed by Injection Flaws, particularly 
SQL injection. 
Computer Security Institute/FBI concluded in a 
survey [3] that defacement of web sites is a problem 
for many organizations, as 92% of the respondents 
reported more than 10 web site incidents. Another 
study provided by the Gartner Group reveals that 75% 
of the attacks are on web based applications [4]. An 
Acunetix audit result says “on average 70% of 
websites are at serious and immediate risk of being 
hacked... and... 91% of these websites contained some 
form of website vulnerability, ranging from the more 
serious ones such as SQL Injection and Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS)…” [6]. These attacks basically take 
advantage of improper coded applications due to 
unchecked input fields at user interface. This allows 
the attacker to change the SQL commands that are sent 
to the database (SQL Injection) or through the input of 
HTML and a scripting language (XSS). The popularity 
of these exploitations is due to: the easiness of finding 
and exploiting such vulnerabilities [2]; the importance 
of the assets they can disclosure; and the level of 
damage they may inflict. These allow attackers to 
access unauthorized data (read, insert, change or 
delete), gain access to privileged database accounts, 
impersonate another user, mimicry web applications, 
deface web pages, get access to the web server, etc.  
To prevent this scenario developers are encouraged 
to follow the best coding practices, perform security 
reviews of the code and regular auditing, to use code 
vulnerability analyzers, etc. However, web application 
developers normally focus on application 
functionalities and on satisfying the user’s 
requirements due to time constraints, and easily 
neglect security aspects. Even the common widely 
used Rapid Application Development environments 
produce code with vulnerabilities. 
Web vulnerability scanners are often regarded as an 
easy way to test the security of web applications, 
including critical vulnerabilities such as SQL injection 
and XSS. The approach followed in this paper consists 
of injecting software faults into a web application code 
and checking if web vulnerability scanners can detect 
the potential vulnerabilities created by the injected 
faults. The possible creation of vulnerabilities is 
confirmed manually in order to get accurate measures 
of the detection coverage and false positives. The 
software faults injected represent the most common 
types of software faults found in a field study [5]. 
These have been adapted for the web application 
environment. 
Fault injection techniques are quite common for 
assessment of critical fault tolerant systems. Most of 
the techniques inject hardware faults (e.g., [7]) or 
emulate the injection of hardware faults by software 
(e.g., [8]). The injection of realistic software faults 
(i.e., program defects or bugs) is relatively new [9, 10]. 
In this paper we use the Generic Software Fault 
Injection Technique (G-SWFIT) [5] to inject common 
programmer bugs in the web application code. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
presents some background on automatic web 
vulnerability scanners. Section 3 describes the 
proposed approach to test and compare web 
vulnerability scanners. Section 4 presents the 
experiments and discusses the results and Section 5 
concludes the paper and describes future work. 
 
2. Detection of vulnerabilities in web 
applications 
 
There are two main approaches to test web 
applications for vulnerabilities: “white box” and “black 
box”. The “white box” approach consists of the 
analysis of the source code of the web application. 
This can be done manually or by using code analysis 
tools like FORTIFY [11], Ounce [12], Pixy [13], etc. 
To detect SQL injection the static analyzer tool uses 
the web application code to follow all the possible 
paths and the changes it may go through due to the 
manipulation process of the SQL query text and finally 
parses the result. Exhaustive source code analysis may 
not find all security flaws because of the complexity of 
the code. In these situations it is preferable to use the 
“black box” approach. In this approach the scanner 
does not know the internals of the web application and 
it uses fuzzing techniques over the web HTTP 
requests. It provides an automatic way to search for 
vulnerabilities avoiding the repetitive and tedious task 
of doing hundreds or even thousands of tests by hand 
for each vulnerability type. This technique is called 
penetration testing and is actually a form of robustness 
testing, as the tool submits nonsense or malicious 
values to the web application evaluating its response to 
see if the penetration attempts were successful. 
According to the survey presented in [3], penetration 
testing is the second most used technique to evaluate 
the effectiveness of security, being used by 66% of the 
respondents. That is why the methodology proposed in 
this paper adopts the “black box” testing approach 
using web vulnerability scanners. 
There are many commercial web vulnerability 
scanners such as Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner 
[14], Spi Dynamics Webinspect [15], Watchfire 
AppScan [16], Buyservers Falcove [17], N-Stalker 
Web Application Security Scanner [18], and Cenzic 
Hailstrom [19]. Examples of free web vulnerability 
scanners include Gamja [20] and BrupSuite [21], but 
they are usually limited scripting tools not fully 
automatic as their commercial equivalent.  
These scanners include normally three main stages: 
configuration, crawling, and scanning. The 
configuration stage includes the definition of the 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the web 
application and the setup of parameters.  
In the crawling stage the vulnerability scanner 
produces a map of the internal structure of the web 
application. This stage is of utmost importance because 
failing to discover some pages of the application will 
prevent their testing (in the subsequent scanning 
stage). The scanner calls the first web page and then 
examines its code searching for links. Each link found 
is requested and this procedure is executed over and 
over until no more links or pages can be found. 
The scanning stage is where the automated 
penetration test is performed against the web 
application by simulating a browser user clicking on 
links and filling in form fields. During this stage 
thousands of tests are executed. Malformed requests 
are also sent in order to learn the error responses. The 
requests and the responses are recorded and analyzed 
using vulnerability policies. The responses are also 
validated using data collected during the crawling 
stage. During this stage new links are frequently 
discovered and when this happens they are added to 
the result of the crawler in order to be also scanned for 
vulnerabilities. 
After the scanning stage the results are shown to the 
user and they may be saved for later analysis. Most 
scanners also show some generic information about the 
vulnerabilities discovered, including how to avoid or 
correct them. Besides the graphical user interface, most 
scanners also have a command line application with 
several parameters aimed for automation by using 
batch jobs. 
Scanners use the layout engine of one internet 
browser to process the responses of the web server. 
There are several layout engines available, like Gecko 
from Mozilla, WebKit from Safari, Presto from Opera, 
but the scanners usually use the Trident from Internet 
Explorer. The layout engines interpret the HTML code 
differently and do not completely support its related 
standards [22]. Some vulnerabilities affect only a 
specific browser or version, usually due to the relaxed 
way the layout engine treats the HTML code. 
Scanners also have a collection of signatures of 
known vulnerabilities of different versions of web 
servers, operating system and also of some network 
configurations. These signatures are updated regularly 
as new vulnerabilities are discovered. They also have a 
pre-defined set of tests of some generic types of 
vulnerabilities like SQL injection and XSS. In the 
search for vulnerabilities like XSS and SQL injection, 
the scanners execute lots of pattern variations adapted 
to the specific test in order to discover the vulnerability 
and to verify if it is not a false positive. The tests for 
these kinds of vulnerabilities, including both the 
sequences of input values and the way to detect 
success or failure, are quite different from scanner to 
scanner, so the results obtained by different tools may 
vary a lot (this is actually one of the reasons why it is 
so important to have means to compare different 
scanners). 
 
3. Web vulnerability scanners benchmarking 
approach 
 
The proposed approach to evaluate the web 
application vulnerability scanners consists of injecting 
realistic software faults (one fault at each time) in the 
code of a given web application. The results of the 
various scanners are compared evaluating the 
efficiency in identifying the potential vulnerabilities 
created by the injected fault. In other words, if web 
vulnerability scanners are supposed to detect 
vulnerabilities (which are caused by residual software 
faults in the web application code), then our idea 
consists of providing the scanners with the input they 
are supposed to handle, which is a web code with 
software faults and possible vulnerabilities originated 
by such faults.  
The process of injecting faults in the web 
application, running the vulnerability scanners, and 
analyzing and comparing the results is completely 
automatic. However, in these first experiments we 
decided to inspect manually the potential 
vulnerabilities caused by each injected fault in order to 
have precise control on the experiment results and get 
precise measures on the percentage of vulnerabilities 
and false positives detected by each tool. 
The following subsections discuss the software fault 
injection process and describe the proposed 
benchmarking procedure in detail. 
 
3.1. Software fault injection in web 
applications 
 
The variety of mistakes (i.e., software bugs) found 
in a deployed code tends to be enormous [23], which 
makes the exhaustive classification of software faults a 
cumbersome task. Nevertheless, field studies show that 
the most frequent types of software faults belong to a 
small group [5, 9]. In other words, there are a small 
number of software fault types that account for the 
majority of faults found in a field, while there is a huge 
variety of relatively rare types of faults [5].  
The software fault injection technique used in this 
paper is the G-SWFIT. This technique just focuses on 
the emulation of the most frequent types of faults. It is 
based on a set of fault injection operators that 
reproduce directly in the target executable code the 
instruction sequences that represent most common 
types of high-level software faults. These fault 
injection operators resulted from a field study that 
analyzed and classified more than 600 real software 
faults discovered in several programs, identifying the 
most common (the “top-N”) types of software faults 
[5]. Table 1 shows the 12 most frequent types of faults 
found in [5] that we use in the present paper. The ODC 
classes are fault classes defined according to the IBM’s 
ODC classification [23]. 
The locations in the target code where the injection 
is performed are selected by the G-SWFIT tool in 
order to assure that a given fault type is only injected 
in a code location where that kind of fault could 
realistically exist. For example, MIFS fault type in 
Table 1 can only be injected in target code locations 
that represent an IF structure. Furthermore, in [5] are 
defined a set of restrictions (based on the field 
observations) used by the G-SWFIT tool to increase 
the realism of the injected fault.  
The original G-SWFIT operators were not defined 
with a web application code in mind, as the field study 
reported in [5] mainly addressed programs written in 
C. Although the G-SWFIT fault operators were also 
evaluated for other languages (see [5] for details), none 
of them were typical programming languages used for 
the development of web applications (e.g., PHP, ASP, 
Java, .NET). Thus, small adaptations in the fault 
operators proposed in [5] had to be introduced to use 
them for our purposes. Most of the changes are trivial 
adaptations such as the one used for the “MVI” 
operator. As in PHP there is no need for variable 
initialization so we applied this operator in the first 
assignment of a variable (and not in the initialization). 
Another small change is in the “MIA” operator where 
we use it even in the situation where there is one “else” 
but it is closely related to the “if”, like the display of an 
error message. The biggest change was in the “MFC” 
operator. In web application programming there are 
normally lots of functions that process a parameter and 
returns the same data type as the parameter or a data 
type that can be used correctly by the program. For 
example in PHP code we can have: 
<? echo 'test.php?id='.urlencode($id); ?> 
where the “urlencode” function encodes the string 
variable “$id” to be passed as a GET parameter in the 
URL. If the developer forgets to use the 
“urlencode($id)” therefore using only the “$id” 
variable, the code can still be interpreted without any 
problem by the web server. So it is feasible that the 
software developer may forget to use this function and 
pass the “$id” directly as the GET parameter. However 
according to [5] we could not insert this kind of fault 
because it fails to follow the restriction of the “MFC” 
operator. According to [5] this operator should be 
applied only when the return value of the function is 
not being used by any of the subsequent instructions. 
To overcome this situation we relaxed the restriction 
defined in [5] and created a new operator named 
“Missing function call extended”. All the other fault 
operators were used as defined in [5] (with minor 
adjustments in some classes, as mentioned above). 
 
3.2. Testing procedure 
 
The injection of the software faults (one fault at a 
time) consists of two stages:  
• In the first stage the code of the target web 
application is examined in order to identify all the 
points where each type of fault can be injected, 
resulting in a list of possible faults. When the list 
of faults is very large (because the application code 
is extensive, resulting in lots of possible locations 
for each fault type), only a percentage of the fault 
locations is used, keeping the relative percentages 
shown in Table 1.  
• The second stage comprises the injection of each 
fault, which corresponds to the insertion of the 
code change (defined by the fault operator) in the 
web application. After injecting each fault, the web 
application is scanned by the tools under 
evaluation to compare their results. 
The proposed testing procedure needs two 
computers connected to an Ethernet network. One 
computer acts as a server executing the functions of a 
web server, an application server and a database 
server. The other computer acts as a client with a web 
Table 1 – Most frequent fault types found in [5] 
Fault types Description % of total observed in field study ODC classes 
MIFS Missing "If (cond) { statement(s) }" 9.96 % Algorithm 
MFC Missing function call 8.64 % Algorithm 
MLAC Missing "AND EXPR" in expression used as branch condition 7.89 % Checking 
MIA Missing "if (cond)" surrounding statement(s) 4.32 % Checking 
MLPC Missing small and localized part of the algorithm 3.19 % Algorithm 
MVAE Missing variable assignment using an expression 3.00 % Assignment 
WLEC Wrong logical expression used as branch condition 3.00 % Checking 
WVAV Wrong value assigned to a value 2.44 % Assignment 
MVI Missing variable initialization 2.25 % Assignment 
MVAV Missing variable assignment using a value 2.25 % Assignment 
WAEP Wrong arithmetic expression used in parameter of function call 2.25 % Interface 
WPFV Wrong variable used in parameter of function call 1.50 % Interface 
 Total faults coverage 50.69 %  
browser. It is in this computer where the vulnerability 
scanner is executed. 
The experiments need some operations executed in 
the server computer and some in the client computer, 
in synchronism. Because of the large number of tests 
and the long duration of the whole process a Java 
software tool was developed to automate the 
procedure. This Java tool is deployed in the client 
computer and is able to communicate with the server 
computer in order to be able to automatically execute 
all the procedures needed by the tests. 
The experiments start with a “gold run” where the 
web application is tested once by each vulnerability 
scanner without any faults injected. The web 
application may already have some vulnerabilities and 
this run will be able to find most of them. 
After the “gold run” the Java tool reads the file with 
fault definitions (set of faults to inject identified in the 
first fault injection stage) that will be used in the tests. 
Then, for each fault, the following procedure is 
executed:  
1) Every test starts with a restoration of the initial 
setup: the web server is restarted; the database is 
restored; and the website files are copied from a clean 
backup. 
2) The next fault is injected into the web 
application. 
3) The scanner application is started and at the end 
the results are saved into a file. The file name includes 
a reference to the delta file, the web application file 
and the type of fault injected. The Java tool monitors 
the scanner application in order to detect when its 
execution stops before continuing the next test. 
4) This procedure is repeated from 1) to 3) until all 
the faults are injected. 
5) This procedure (from steps 1 to 4) is also 
repeated for all the web vulnerability scanners. 
After all tests have been performed, every file 
resulting from the execution of the scanners is 
manually analyzed using the algorithm presented in 
Figure 1. In these experiments we are only interested 
in the XSS and SQL Injection vulnerabilities, so when 
the scanner reports other types of vulnerabilities they 
are ignored. All the reported vulnerabilities are 
checked for false positives. It is also verified if the 
vulnerability is derived from the fault injected or if it is 
a vulnerability that was already present in the 
application and has not been detected in the “gold 
run”. The vulnerabilities are also verified manually to 
confirm that they are unique and not the same 
vulnerability tested in a different way. This happens 
when the same vulnerable code is executed when the 
web application code is called from different places. 
For instance, when we press the “Insert” button or the 
“Update” button in a FORM they may execute some 
common code. If the vulnerability is in the common 
code they will be triggering the same vulnerability and 
it should only be accounted only once. 
 
4. Case study experiments and discussion 
 
For the evaluation experiments we used LAMP 
(Linux, Apache, Mysql and PHP) web applications. 
The server runs Linux and the web server is Apache. 
This server hosts a PHP developed web application 
using a Mysql database. This topology of operating 
system and software was chosen because it represents 
one of the most used technologies to build custom web 
applications nowadays. It is also responsible for a large 
number of SQL injection and XSS security 
vulnerabilities, which are our target vulnerabilities. 
We used three commercial web application 
vulnerability scanners, that we named Scanner 1, 
Scanner 2, and Scanner 3. We have decided to keep 
the brand and the versions of the web vulnerability 
scanners anonymous to assure neutrality and because 
commercial licenses do not allow in general the 
publication of tool evaluation results. 
 In order to obtain a more complete evaluation of 
the three scanners, we decided to test two web 
applications. One of the target web applications is 
custom made and is called MyReferences. It is mainly 
used to manage personal reference information. It 
allows the storage of pdf documents, and some 
information like their title, authors and year of 
publication. The underlined database used has 
 
Figure 1: Algorithm applied to the scanner generated files. 
currently 114 publications stored and 311 authors. The 
web application code consists of 12 PHP files and an 
overall of 1,436 lines of code. The second web 
application is the Online BooksStore 
(http://www.gotocode.com/apps.asp?app_id=3). It is a 
fully functional and ready to use online store generated 
with the Rapid Web Application Development 
Framework CodeCharge 
(http://www.yessoftware.com/products/product_detail.
php?product_id=1). This application is composed of 
29 PHP files with a total of 9,437 lines of code. 
All the 12 most frequent types of faults found in 
Table 1 were used in the experiments for the 
MyReferences web application. Every filename of the 
web application was analyzed looking for locations of 
every fault type. In the MyReferences 659 faults were 
injected (Table 2a). 
Due to time constraints during the testing with the 
BookStore web application, we just have preliminary 
result of the experiments of the injection of 3 types of 
faults and only two vulnerability scanner applications. 
Because of its size we found 1,322 fault locations, thus 
we applied the percentages of total observed in field 
study shown in Table 1 resulting in the injection of 
327 faults in the web application (Table 2b).  
The faults injected leaded to application bugs and 
application malfunctioning, but they also produced a 
considerable amount of security vulnerabilities (18% 
for the MyReferences web application and 4% for the 
BookStore application). Note that some injected bugs 
produced more than one type of vulnerabilities (XSS 
and SQL Injection) and some produced more than one 
vulnerability of the same type. The number of 
vulnerabilities found without any fault injected in the 
BookStore application was 29. We consider this a very 
high number because these intrinsic vulnerabilities 
masquerade the discovery of new vulnerabilities 
leaving less code to inject them. 
As we can see, from the 12 fault types only 6 
produced vulnerabilities. They are the MIFS the MFC 
extended, the MLAC, the MIA, the WLEC and the 
WPFV. The vulnerabilities generated by every fault 
type were both XSS and SQL Injection. 
 The distribution of the two types of vulnerabilities 
is shown in Table 3a and Table 3b. Fault injection 
produced more than the double of SQL Injection type 
than the XSS type for the MyReferences and almost 
the opposite for the BookStore showing that there is no 
pattern regularity in this segmentation of the results. 
Table 3a – MyReferences type of vulnerabilities 
 SQL Injection XSS 
 # 81 37 
% 69% 31% 
 
Table 3b – BookStore type of vulnerabilities 
 SQL Injection XSS 
# 5 8 
% 38% 62% 
In terms of the way the vulnerability may be 
Table 2a – MyReferences experimental results. 
    Scanner 1 Scanner 2 Scanner 3 










Inject. XSS SQL Inject. # % 
No Fault Injected 0 7 0 1 1 11 1 12 2 14  
MIFS 23 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 9% 
MFC 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
MFC extended 71 8 5 2 16 6 36 20 39 59 83% 
MLAC 48 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 4% 
MIA 55 4 7 2 1 1 8 5 10 15 27% 
MLPC 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
MVAE 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
WLEC 76 3 7 3 3 0 8 7 12 19 25% 
WVAV 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
MVI 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
MVAV 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
WAEP 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
WPFV 148 0 13 0 0 0 12 2 19 21 14% 
Total (injected) 659 25 33 8 21 19 66 49 83 118 18% 
Table 2b – BookStore experimental results (not complete results yet) 
    Scanner 1 Scanner 3 
sum of the distinct vulnerabilities found by 
scanners 
Fault Types # Faults XSS SQL Injec. XSS SQL Inject. XSS SQL Inject. # % 
No Fault Injected 0 12 0 22 1 27 1 29  
MIFS 120 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 3% 
MFC 103 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
MFC extended 104 3 3 3 4 4 5 9 9% 
Total (injected) 327 19 3 29 5 35 6 42 4% 
exploited there are much more vulnerabilities that are 
exploited through the HTTP GET submission method 
than through the HTTP POST submission method in 
both applications (Table 4a, Table 4b). Although the 
HTTP GET can be exploited more easily by an 
attacker because all it needs is to change the URL we 
believe that these values may change according to the 
submission methods used by the web application. 
Table 4a – MyReferences HTTP submission methods 
 GET POST 
# 71 47 
% 60% 40% 
 
Table 4b – BookStore HTTP submission methods 
 GET POST 
# 9 4 
% 69% 31% 
All the scanners have detected some vulnerabilities 
that none of the others have. To analyze the scanners 
coverage a manual inspection was performed by a 
human tester examining both the PHP code and the 
browser results. This hand scan detected 17 
vulnerabilities that have not been detected by neither 
of the automatic vulnerability scanners, corresponding 
to 9% of all the vulnerabilities found (Figure 2a, 
Figure 2b, Figure 2c). For the BookStore application a 
complete hand scan was not done due to time 
constraints, however some quick tests show the 
existence of some second order vulnerabilities that 
were not detected by the scanners, which confirms the 
trend observed in the MyReferences experiments. 
The intersection area of the circles (Figure 2a, 
Figure 2b, Figure 2c) represent vulnerabilities detected 
by more than one scanner (the number of 
vulnerabilities detected are shown). As we can see, the 
circle representing manual scan does not intersect with 
the other circles, which means that the vulnerabilities 
detected by manual inspection were not detected by 
any of the tools evaluated. It is also worth noting that 
the radius of each circle is proportional to the number 
of vulnerabilities detected, providing a comparative 
graphic image of the coverage of each tool. The 
observation of Figure 2c clearly shows that scanner 3 
is the best one concerning coverage of vulnerability 
detection, followed by scanner 1 and scanner 2. 
However, we can also see that the best scanner for 
SQL Injection is not the best for XSS (Figure 2b). 
While some undetected vulnerabilities should have 
been detected by the vulnerability scanners there are 
others that would be difficult for a tool using the 
“black box” approach, such as second order 
vulnerabilities. In the first stage of this vulnerability 
type the attacker changes something that would not be 
noticed immediately. This change would only perform 
its malicious action later on (second stage) when some 
condition is encountered. For example, in the first 
stage the attacker inserts in a database field a malicious 
string containing an XSS exploit. By introducing this 
string nothing strange happens in the web application 
or in the database. The second stage may be the 
activation of the code injected in stage one by a bug 
that is triggered when the malicious string is displayed 
by the browser. Another difficulty for the scanners is 
when the exploit needs some specific tokens to be 
present. These tokens may be the right number of 
parenthesis in a SQL Injection attempt, or some precise 
HTML code in an XSS attack. Although the scanners 
have some fuzzy variations of tests, these will hardly 
cover all the possible combinations. 
Although the scanners have found most of the 
vulnerabilities they also have detected many false 
positives, as shown in Table 5a and Table 5b. As we 
expected the false positive rate tends to be directly 
proportional to the capacity to detect vulnerabilities. 
Table 5a – MyReferences false positives 
 Scanner 1 Scanner 2 Scanner 3 
# 13 43 45 








































Figure 2a: MyReferences SQL Injection 
coverage 
Figure 2b: MyReferences XSS 
coverage 
Figure 2c: MyReferences total coverage 
Table 5b – BookStore false positives 
 Scanner 1 Scanner 2 Scanner 3 
# 6  36 
% 38%  77% 
Moreover there is a characterization of false 
positives types found in the MyReferences application. 
One of them is an error issued by the web application 
in normal execution due to the fault injected. This error 
message was found in 10 cases of the scanner 1, in 43 
cases of the scanner 3, and in 40 cases of the scanner 
2. In the penetration test the same error was shown and 
that triggered the scanner. The other three remaining 
cases of false positives found by scanner 1 and the two 
remaining by scanner 3 were not possible to be 
reproduced. The three remaining false positives found 
by scanner 2 were curiously triggered by the title of a 
paper about SQL Injection, stored in the web 
application backend database. 
The analysis of the false positives of the BookStore 
application found 7 cases of an erroneous logout of the 
web application. In 3 other cases the attack can not be 
reproduced and in the other cases the false positive is 




In this paper we propose an approach to evaluate 
and compare web application vulnerability scanners. It 
is based on the injection of realistic software faults in 
web applications in order to compare the efficiency of 
the different tools in the detection of the possible 
vulnerabilities caused by the injected bugs. The results 
of the evaluation of three leading web application 
vulnerability scanners show that different scanners 
produce quite different results and that all of them 
leave a considerable percentage of vulnerabilities 
undetected. The percentage of false positives is very 
high, ranging from 20% to 77% in the experiments 
performed. The results obtained also show that the 
proposed approach allows easy comparison of 
coverage and false positives of the web vulnerability 
scanners. In addition to the evaluation and comparison 
of vulnerability scanners, the proposed approach also 
can be used to improve the quality of vulnerability 
scanners, as it easily shows their limitations. For some 
critical web applications several scanners should be 
used and a hand scan should not be discarded from the 
process. 
For future work we intend to apply this benchmark 
procedure to other web applications to better 
understand the relationship between software faults 
and vulnerabilities. Knowing what kind of 
programming mistakes usually lead to security 
vulnerabilities can be an important tool to help in the 
detection and prevention of a security flaw. We also 
want to evaluate different configurations of the same 
scanner and study the association of scanners to cover 
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